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THE EFFECT OF MISUNDERSTANDING ON 
CONTRACT FORMATION AND REFORMATION 
UNDER THE RESTATEMENT OF 
CONTRACTS SECOND 
George E. Palmer* 
T HE presence of misunderstanding at the time of an apparent agreement creates difficult problems in the law of contract 
formation and equally difficult problems when the apparent agree-
ment is in ·writing and reformation is sought. The rules formulated 
in the original Restatement of Contracts are unsatisfactory in both 
areas. The preparation of the Restatement Second, which is now 
under way for contracts, includes changes in the rules of contract 
formation but the changes emerging are no more satisfactory than 
the original rules. The current version of the Restatement Second, 
contained in Tentative Draft No. 1,1 accepts the objective theory 
of contract formation,2 as did the original Restatement,3 but the 
attempt to formulate general rules based on that theory contains 
two principal shortcomings that seem almost at cross purposes. 
In one aspect it limits doctrine too narrowly, so as to lead to the con-
clusion that there is no contract in some situations in which a 
contract should and almost certainly will be found. In another as-
pect it extends doctrine beyond permissible limits, so as to lead 
to a finding of contract in instances where there should be none. 
For immediate purposes each of these statements is best ex-
plained by an example: 
(1) If A, the ovmer of two tracts of land, intends to offer Black-
acre for sale to B, but by mistake his ·writing transmitting the offer 
describes Whiteacre, and B accepts in the honest belief that the offer 
means what it says, there should be a valid contract to sell White-
acre and there undoubtedly is under most modem decisions.4 Yet a 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
I. REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964) [hereinafter cited 
as TENTATIVE DRAFT]. 
2. Id. § 2, comment b: "The phrase 'manifestation of intention' adopts an 
external or objective standard for interpreting conduct; it means the external ex-
pression of intention as distinguished from undisclosed intention." 
3. REsrATE!IIENT, CONTRACTS § 20, comment a (1932): "Not mutual assent but a 
manifestation indicating such assent is what the law requires." 
4. An example of the general approach is furnished by Kipe Offset Process Co. 
v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). In cases involving misunderstanding 
as to the identity of land described in a contract of sale, it has usually been assumed 
that there was a contract and the case has turned on whether the mistaken party 
[ 33] 
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literal appli~ation of the Tentative Draft would lead to the con-
clusion, probably unintended, that there is no contract. In part, the 
fault lies in a failure to take sufficient account of the effects of 
mistake, a fault that appears also in the efforts of leading writers 
to formulate general rules governing contract formation.5 
(2) If A intends to and does offer to sell Blackacre to B, but B 
accepts in the belief that the offer describes Whiteacre and A 
knows of this belief, A cannot hold B to a contract for the sale 
of Blackacre. Nor is there a contract for the sale of Whiteacre under 
the present Restatement, a position believed to be preferable as 
a general formulation of contract doctrine, although the facts of 
a particular case may justify holding A to such a contract on the 
basis of estoppel. In the Tentative Draft of the Restatement Second, 
however, the rules are so formulated as to lead to the automatic 
finding of a contract to sell Whiteacre. This may represent an at-
tempt to bring about a correspondence between the rules relat-
ing to contract formation and those relating to reformation, for, 
under the present Restatement, there is a striking lack of corre-
spondence. As will be suggested later, the proper corrective is to 
change the rules governing reformation. 6 
Both of these shortcomings in the Tentative Draft seem to stem 
in part from an unwise and fruitless attempt to eliminate all legal 
distinctions between ambiguous and unambiguous language, or at 
least all distinctions phrased in those terms. 
I. THE NEED FOR EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF CONTRACT 
A. The Restatement Second 
In section 21A of the Tentative Draft, the first subsection reads 
in part as follows: "There is no manifestation of mutual assent to 
an exchange if the parties attach materially different meanings to 
their manifestations and . . . neither party knows or has reason 
to know the meaning attached by the other."7 In the first example 
(that is, the party whose understanding differed from that clearly expressed) was 
entitled to rescission. In the following cases rescission was denied: Beebe v. Birkett, 
109 Mich. 663, 67 N.W. 966 (1896); Wheeler v. Holloway, 276 S.W. 653 (Tex. Comm'n 
App. 1925). In Fleischer v. McGehee, 111 Ark. 626, 163 S.W. 169 (1914), rescission 
was granted. In Goodrich v. Lathrop, 94 Cal. 56, 29 Pac. 329 (1892), it was held that 
the mistaken party was entitled to rescission unless he was negligent. 
5. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 106 (1963); see note 13 infra. 
6. See text accompanying notes 62-74 infra. 
7. The full text of § 21A is as follows: 
(1) There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties 
attach materially different meanings to their manifestations and 
(a) neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning attached by the 
other; or 
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used above, A did not know that B meant to buy Whiteacre, and in 
order to bind A to a contract for the sale of that tract, it would be 
necessary under the proposed rule to find that A had "reason to 
know" of B's understanding. In fact, A is bound in accordance with 
B's understanding because he used words that clearly and unambigu-
ously had the meaning B gave to them. There is no need to carry 
the matter any further on the issue of contract formation. This 
has been generally settled in American law for a long time; as the 
Massachusetts court said in 1880, a "party cannot escape the natural 
and reasonable interpretation which must be put on what he says 
and does, by showing that his words were used and his acts done 
with a different and undisclosed intention."8 In some instances a 
party's undisclosed intent differs from that expressed because of 
a mechanical error in communication, as in the first example. But 
the same misunderstanding can occur in other ways, with the same 
result, as where the writing clearly describes Whiteacre but the 
purchaser has looked at the wrong lot and thinks he is buying 
Blackacre. The rule formulated in the Tentative Draft, in terms 
of "reason to know," is wholly inappropriate in such cases. 
An attempt is made in the Tentative Draft to give meaning to 
the "reason to know" test, by stating that a person "has reason to 
know a fact, present or future, if he has information from which 
a person of ordinary intelligence would infer that the fact in ques-
tion does or will exist."9 This presupposes a knowledge of facts 
which is lacking when a party is acting under the influence of 
mistake. In the first example, A's mistake meant that he did not 
possess the necessary information from which a person of ordinary 
intelligence would infer that B intended to purchase Whiteacre. 
There is no sensible meaning that can be given to the words "rea-
son to know" so as to find a basis for contract within the scope of 
the rule stated in section 2 IA; yet, as previously suggested, such a 
reading of the rule is probably not intended. This is indicated by the 
following illustration used in the Tentative Draft: "A ·writes an offer 
to B, which he encloses in an envelope, addresses and stamps. 
(b) each party knows or each party has reason to know the meaning attached 
by the other. 
(2) The manifestations of the parties are operative in accordance with the 
meaning attached to them by one of the parties if 
(a) that party does not know of any different meaning attached by the other, 
and the other knows the meaning attached by the first party; or 
(b) that party has no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the 
other, and the other has reason to know the meaning attached by the first 
party. 
8. Stoddard v. Ham, 129 Mass. 383, 385-86, 37 Am. Rep. 369, 370 (1880). 
9. TENTATIVE DRAFT § 21, comment b. Compare REsTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY 
§ 9, comment d (1958); REsTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 12, comment a (1965). 
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Shortly afterwards, he decides not to send the offer, but by mistake 
he deposits it in the mail. It is delivered to B, who accepts the offer. 
There is a contract unless B knows or has reason to know of A's 
error."10 The conclusion is entirely proper but it cannot be reached 
under any sensible meaning of the "reason to know" formula. Yet, 
under the Tentative Draft, the situation must be worked out in 
terms of that formula.11 Again, the offerer (A) lacks the relevant 
information that would give him reason to know, and again the 
stated rule fails to take sufficient account of the effects of mistake. 
The proper inquiry in the last illustrative case, in the Black-
acre-Whiteacre illustration, and in cases of misunderstanding gen-
erally, is whether one party should be held to the understanding 
of the other, or whether each is entitled to adhere to his own ver-
sion of the situation. In the two illustrations, there was an appear-
ance of mutual assent to terms containing no ambiguity, and A's 
conduct caused B's belief that the reality corresponded with this 
appearance, whereas no act of B contributed to A's opposite belief. 
In such circumstances there is a contract and if the mistake has any 
legal significance it is to provide a basis for rescission. Rescission in 
such cases is kept within narrow limits.12 
This language of the Tentative Draft is wholly new for cases 
involving no ambiguity. A "reason to know" test is used in the 
present Restatement, but it is limited to instances of ambiguity or 
uncertainty. The proposed change shows the influence of Corbin's 
·wTitings, and seems to be the product of a misguided effort to formu-
late doctrine and solve actual problems without reference to whether 
the words and acts serving as means of communication benveen 
the parties were ambiguous or unambiguous. Thus Corbin states 
that, in cases of misunderstanding, one party will be held to the 
understanding of the other "if (and only if) the one party knew or 
had reason to know the intention and understanding of the other 
and the latter had no reason to know that a difference existed.''13 
10. TENTATIVE DRAFT § 21, Illustration 3. 
11. The illustration is used under § 21 of the TENTATIVE DRAFT, which formulates 
the general rule as follows: "(2) The conduct of a party is not effective as a manifesta• 
tion of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason 
to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents." As applied 
to the illustration, A is not bound under the language of section 21 unless he has 
"reason to know" that B may infer assent from his conduct. In fact, he is bound in 
any event unless, as the illustration states, B knows or has reason to know that A did 
not intend to contract. • 
12. PALMER, MISTAKE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 45 (1962), and cases cited note 4 
supra. 
13. 1 CoRBIN, CoNTRACTs § 106, at 476 (1963). Essentially the same position is stated 
in slightly different phrasing in §§ 104 and 107. In § 107 it is said that if "there has 
in fact been no such 'meeting of the minds,' the court will not hold a party bound 
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The statement that there is a contract if such circumstances are 
present will be examined in Part II. The statement that there is a 
contract only if they are present is not supported by the cases and 
is in conflict with good policy. 
If a person intends to offer property for sale for $1,000 but due 
to the error of a clerk in his office the telegram transmitting the 
offer reads $800, an acceptance by the offeree without suspicion of 
mistake will form a contract for a price of $800.14 To say that this 
is because the offeror had "reason to know" the offeree's under-
standing is to make the supposed requirement meaningless. The 
controlling fact is that the offeree gave the words or symbols their 
usual meaning; on the issue of contract formation the offeror will 
be held to that meaning. 
The "reason to know" concept is sometimes useful, but its role 
needs to be understood. If the off eree had "reason to know" that 
a mistake had been made in the telegraphed offer, this would lead 
a court to hold either that there was no contract,15 or that the 
offeror was entitled to rescind the contract for mistake.16 The con-
cept may be significant also when language can reasonably be given 
more than one meaning and the parties followed different mean-
ings; one of them may be held to the sense in which the other used 
by a contract varying from his own understanding unless his words and conduct 
were such that he had reason to know that the other party would be and was in 
fact misled." As the universal rule which it purports to be, this is not acceptable. 
No cases are cited in direct support of either this statement or that quoted in 
the text above, but a similar statement in § 104 is accompanied by a citation of 
nine cases, none of which provides the necessary support. Id. § 104 n.79. 
The influence of Corbin on the Tentative Draft is suggested in recent articles 
by both Professor Corbin and Professor Braucher, who is the Reporter for the 
Restatement of Contracts Second. Braucher, Offer and Acceptance in the Second Re-
statement, 74 YALE L.J. 302 (1964); Corbin, Sixty-Eight Years at Law, 13 KAN. L. REv. 
183, 187 (1964). 
14. Cargill Comm'n Co. v. Mowery, 99 Kan. 389, 161 Pac. 634 (1916); Ayer v. 
Western Union Tel. Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. 495 (1887). Whether the contract will 
be rescinded at suit of the party harmed by the error is another matter. In the 
Cargill case, the court intimated that rescission would have been available except 
for the fact that the other party had changed position in reliance on the contract. 
A seller used the wrong code words in offering to sell wheat so that the telegram 
as transmitted to and accepted by the buyer offered 30,000 to 35,000 bushels, whereas 
the seller intended to offer 3,000 to 3,500 bushels. Because the buyer had in tum 
sold a like amount of wheat in reliance on the contract, it was held that the offer 
as transmitted was binding on the seller. Except for the change of position, the 
court said that the error "could have been corrected." There is no basis for cor-
rection in the law of reformation; presumably the court had in mind accomplishing 
the same result by rescinding unless the buyer agreed to a correction. 
15. Mummenhoff v. Randall, 19 Ind. App. 44, 49 N.E. 40 (1898); 1 W1LUSTON, 
CoNTRACIS § 94 (3d ed. 1957); see note 11, supra. 
16. Hudson Structural Steel Co. v. Smith 8: Rumery Co., 110 Me. 123, 85 Atl. 
384 (1912). 
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the words if he had reason to know of it.17 The presence of a reason 
to know is not requisite, however, to a finding of contract in cases 
where there is no significant ambiguity. Professor Corbin's attempt 
to universalize the "reason to know" test so as to cover cases in 
which there is no ambiguity seems to arise from a refusal to recog-
nize that there are circumstances in which, for the purpose at hand, 
language has only one reasonable meaning. "That assumption is 
not made herein," he says in his treatise,18 although in fact at several 
points he states legal propositions in exactly those terms.19 One 
may recognize that language has meaning only in the minds of men 
and yet insist that there are circumstances in which the words 
"eight hundred dollars" have only one reasonable meaning, found 
for example in standard usage. When this occurs and one party 
adopts that meaning, the other will be held to it even though, be-
cause of mistake or for some other reason, he had a different un-
derstanding. 
At other points in his treatise Corbin follows the direction sug-
gested by Wigmore, who sought to formulate contract doctrine by 
analogy to the law of tort through attributing liability to fault.20 
Thus Corbin writes that in cases of misunderstanding it is "very 
clear that no contract should be held to exist unless one of the 
parties so negligently expressed himself that the . other was caused 
reasonably to believe that agreement existed."21 In fact, it is very 
17. l WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 95 (3d ed. 1957). Some uses of the concept in this 
setting are discussed in the text accompanying notes 43-51 infra. 
18. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 104 n.79 (1963). 
19. In the text of § 104 Corbin writes: "If the meaning that either one of them 
gave to the words was the only reasonable one under the existing circumstances, 
as the other party has reason to know, the latter is bound by that meaning and 
there is a contract accordingly." 1 id. § 104, at 464. If the "reason to know" qualifica-
tion were omitted, the statement would be in accord with the views expressed herein. 
In § 599, Corbin again recognizes that a single meaning may be "the only reasonable 
one under the circumstances." 3 id. § 599, at 597. 
20. Wigmore concluded that one party should be held to the understanding of 
the other when that understanding was "the consequence, reasonably to have been 
anticipated under all the circumstances" of the first party's acts of expression. The 
test, he added, is that of "negligence, i.e. responsibility resting on a volition having 
consequences which ought reasonably to have been forseen." 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 2413, at 39 (3d ed. 1940). 
21. 3 CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 599, at 593 (1960). There is a temptation to accept the 
negligence test as a universal because it serves to explain the decisions holding there 
is no contract where a party signing an instrument is mistaken as to its essential 
nature. In Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1946), Judge 
Learned Hand explained the theory of liability this way: "The theory upon which 
a document binds one who signs it, but who does not read it, is that either he 
accepts it whatever may be its contents, or that he has been careless in choosing 
his informant." Whatever may be the merits of this theory, these cases have been 
dealt with in their own terms, and the statement does not provide an adequate 
general theory of contract liability. PALMER, op. dt. supra note 12, at 79-80. 
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clear that contract is not this narrowly limited, unless one is pre-
pared to say that a party is necessarily negligent when he makes a 
mistake. The equation is not acceptable, but if it were accepted 
this would merely eliminate negligence as an independent require-
ment. When one party expresses assent to the terms as written and 
the normal meaning of the terms is also the meaning intended by 
the other party, this ordinarily will be sufficient to result in a con-
tract having that meaning. The first party is held to the justified 
expectation that his act created in the other, nor is this limited to 
cases in which he was careless, or had reason to know of that ex-
pectation, or reasonably should have anticipated it. This is not to 
say that negligence is irrelevant, for clearly this is not true; but 
negligence is not a necessary condition of liability as Corbin's state-
ment would make it. Wigmore's insight is important, but it is no 
universal solvent. Contract doctrine is based less on moral con-
siderations than on a need for security of business arrangements. 
The Tentative Draft of the Restatement Second, in explaining 
its blackletter rules phrased in terms of reason to know, discloses 
the same inadequacy as Corbin's text by asserting that the "basic 
principle governing material misunderstanding is . . . [that] no 
contract is formed if neither party is at fault . . . ."22 This is not 
an acceptable principle, basic or otherwise. There are times when 
misunderstanding of ambiguous terms means there is no contract, 
and if it is useful to do so the cases could be described by saying 
neither party was at fault. But there are other times when neither 
party was at fault yet a contract will be found because in the cir-
cumstances one party will be held to the understanding of the 
other, although he did not share it. The most important circum-
stance is the degree of clarity and definiteness in the words and acts 
constituting the communications between the parties. The attempt 
to formulate doctrine without reference to this factor is bound to 
fai}.2S 
22, TENTATIVE DRAFT § 21A, comment d. 
23. The distinction between clear and ambiguous language is so widely recognized 
that full documentation is unnecessary. One recent case will illustrate the point. 
In an apparent agreement for the sale of "chicken" the parties had given different 
meanings to the word, the buyer intending broilers and the seller intending 
chicken in the generic sense, including stewing chicken. When different usages were 
established, the court decided that the buyer could not hold the seller to a con• 
tract to sell broilers. But it would have been otherwise, Judge Friendly observed, 
if the word had the single meaning asserted by the buyer: the seller's "subjective 
intent would not be significant if this did not coincide with an objective meaning of 
'chicken.'" Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 
121 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
40 Michigan Law Review [VoL 65:33 
B. The Present Restatement 
The present Restatement divides situations involving misunder-
standing into two categories, those in which the relevant words and 
acts have only one reasonable meaning in the circumstances, and 
those in which they have more than one reasonable meaning.24 The 
latter are described as cases in which the manifestations of intention 
are "uncertain or ambiguous,"25 and for convenience will be re-
ferred to here as cases of ambiguity. The categories are drawn too 
sharply and because of this some of the consequences are unsatis-
factory. 
Where the words and acts have only one reasonable meaning in 
the circumstances, the Restatement asserts that there is a contract 
in accordance with that meaning unless one party "knows that the 
other does not intend what his words or other acts express."26 This 
is satisfactory if the first party intends the "one reasonable mean-
ing," but the rule is not so limited. The section is drawn with ex-
treme rigidity, by providing that, where language is unambiguous, 
the undisclosed intention of a party is immaterial, the only excep-
tion being when the other party knows of the discrepancy between 
language and intention. The application of this rule would produce 
a number of curious and quite unacceptable results. For example, 
if one party had one unreasonable meaning and the other had a 
different but equally unreasonable meaning, the rule would pro-
duce a contract that neither of them intended. In situations in-
volving mistake in expression, this result is not as unlikely as it 
sounds. If, for example, A intends to sell Blackacre and B intends 
to buy Whiteacre, but the writing in which they attempt to express 
their supposed agreement mistakenly describes Greenacre, there 
is a valid contract for the sale of Greenacre under the language of 
the Restatement. It is not likely that a court would carry the ob-
jective theory this far, since the reasons underlying that theory are 
not present and the result makes no sense in a controversy between 
the parties.27 The theory aims to protect the just expectations of 
24. Rl::sTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 71 (1932). 
25. Id. § 71(a). 
26. Id. § 71(c). 
27. Corbin uses this example and observes that such a decision would "hold justice 
up to ridicule." 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 539, at 81 (1960). The conclusion in the text 
is forced not only by the language of § 71, but seems also the result contemplated 
under § 230, which deals with integrated contracts, where it is said in comment a that 
"the objective viewpoint of a third person" is the standard for interpretation of 
such contracts. Although the black.letter rule is put in terms of interpretation, the 
first illustration under the section shows that the rule is meant to apply to in-
stances of misunderstanding. This follows the position taken by Williston who wrote: 
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parties to an attempted contract, but neither party expected a 
contract for the sale or purchase of Greenacre. Under the proposed 
Restatement Second, this defect in the present Restatement is elimi-
nated, and, in the case supposed, there would be no contract. 
When the relevant words and acts are ambiguous the present 
Restatement provides that, if one party "has no reason to know 
that they may bear a different meaning to the other party from 
that which he himself attaches to them, his manifestations are 
operative in the formation of a contract only in the event that the 
other party attaches to them the same meaning."28 The draftsman-
ship is inadequate since it is only by implication that the statement 
is limited to cases in which the "other party" actually has a differ-
ent meaning-limited, that is, to cases of misunderstanding as dis-
tinguished from those in which there is mere lack of agreement. 
Thus, where the parties reach apparent agreement on the sale of 
goods shipped from Bombay on the steamer "Peerless" and there 
are two steamers of that name, the existence of a contract does not 
depend upon an agreement on steamer number one. If one party 
has number one in mind, whereas the other knows nothing about 
either and does not care which steamer the goods arrive on, there 
is almost certainly a contract if the court can give meaning to the 
ambiguous language (or, alternatively, find that the specific ship was 
not a vital part of the contract). Only in the case of misunderstand-
ing is there a serious issue of validity,29 and there was no misun-
derstanding on the facts just described, merely a lack of agreement 
on one element. One of the meanings of the objective theory is that 
there need not be agreement in such a case. The parties intended 
a contract, there was an expression of mutual assent, and it is 
enough that the law is able to give a reasonable meaning to the 
expression. This shortcoming in the present Restatement is reme-
Where there is such a justifiable difference of belief concerning the sense in 
which the parties used the words as would prevent the existence of a contract 
had the negotiations been informal ••• [in an integrated contract] the court will 
interpret the writing and give the meaning to it which under the circumstances 
the court conceives the language ought locally to bear. This meaning con-
ceivably may be different from that which either party justifiably attached to 
the words. 
3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 607, at 1741, 1743 (rev. ed. 1936). In this broad form the 
statements are unacceptable. See generally 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 539 (1960). 
28. llEsTATElllENT, CONTRACTS § 7l(a) (1932). 
29. The facts are of course based on the well-known case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 
2 H. &: C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864). The facts are used hypothetically in the 
Restatement as illustration 1 under § 71, with no attempt to limit discussion to 
instances of misunderstanding. 
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died in the Tentative Draft of the Restatement Second, in which 
the relevant section applies only to cases of misunderstanding.30 
The rule of the present Restatement applies to all instances of 
ambiguity without recognition of the possible significance of differ-
ences in degree. There is only one basic division: that between 
words and acts having only one reasonable meaning and those having 
more than one reasonable meaning. Linguistically the two categories 
cover everything, but as a description of human experience they are 
inadequate. There are degrees of reasonableness or unreasonableness 
in the meanings that may be given to words or other acts. As doubts 
increase over whether the meaning given them by a party was the 
only reasonable meaning in the circumstances, other factors are 
sought out in determining whether the other party should be held 
to that meaning when he did not share it. The court may say that 
A had reason to know B's understanding when all it means is that, 
although the words and acts were not as clear as they might have 
been, they pointed strongly enough in the direction of B's under-
standing to make it controlling.31 The court may take into account 
which party used the words32 and the type of transaction in which 
they were used. 33 
In a New York case, United States Rubber Co. v. Silverstein,8.., 
a father told the plaintiff that he would be "good for any sales" 
the plaintiff made to his son Louis, who had recently gone into 
business. The plaintiff made sales to Louis and billed them to the 
father in a statement that also included charges for goods sold to 
the father.85 When the father's second son, Moses, also went into 
business on his own, the plaintiff made sales to him, and at first 
charged them directly to Moses. The father was not satisfied with 
the bills submitted to him that included goods sold to Louis, and 
wrote plaintiff the following letter: 
Enclosed find check for the three above bills. Please do not send 
my statements and my son's statements together. Send him his and 
80. See TENTATIVE DRAFT § 21A, which is the proposed substitute for the present 
§ 71. 
!II. C. W. Craig &: Co. v. Thomas S. Jones &: Co., 200 Ky. 11!1, 252 S.W. 574 (1928). 
See also Castor v. Coppock, 211 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1954); Star-Chronicle Pub, Co. v. 
New York Evening Post, Inc., 256 Fed. 435 (2d Cir. 1919). 
32. United States Rubber Co. v. Silverstein, 229 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E. 12!1 (1920). 
!13. St. Lucie County Bank &: Trust Co. v. Aylin, 94 Fla. 528, 114 So. 4!18 (1927). 
The question was to determine the scope of a contract. A bank loan agreement was 
construed strictly against the bank because it drew the agreement and was in a 
position to dictate its terms. 
!14. 229 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E. 123 (1920). 
!15. This appears somewhat more clearly in the opinion of the trial court. United 
States Rubber Co. v. Silverstein, 161 N.Y. Supp. !169 (Sup. Ct. 1916). 
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me mine. They do business for themself (sic), and therefore send 
them separate statements, but I am good for what they buy.86 
The plaintiff thereafter sold goods to Moses on credit in the belief 
that he was covered by the father's guaranty, and when payment 
was not made suit was brought against the father. The father testi-
fied that he intended the word "they" to refer to Louis and his 
sister, who were in business together. It was held that the case was 
one for the jury, and the jury's finding for the plaintiff was sustained. 
If the testimony was believed there was a misunderstanding 
existing at the time the guaranty was made or acted upon. Strictly, 
no problem of validity of the contract was presented, only its scope, 
but the solution and the factors bearing on it should be the same 
in either event. From a reading of the letter against its background 
it seems evident that the letter cannot properly be regarded as hav-
ing only "one reasonable meaning." This would pin a great deal 
on the use of the word "they," but, as Judge Cardozo once said, 
"in construing the common speech of man, [the law] is not so 
nice in its judgments" as this.87 Under the logic of the Restatement, 
therefore, the letter falls within the category of "uncertain or am-
biguous" language.38 If the issue were one of misunderstanding 
going to the validity of the contract, it would be necessary under 
the Restatement to determine whether either party knows or has 
"reason to know" that the words are "uncertain or ambiguous," or 
whether both do. In this case it seems that the parties are in the 
same boat: either they both know or have "reason to know" or 
neither does. If neither, there is no contract. If both, there is no 
contract. Clearly there is something wrong with this system. It 
fails to take account of degrees of ambiguity as well as other factors 
that may be relevant to the decision. 
For cases involving ambiguity the Tentative Draft, with one 
exception,39 offers about the same solutions as the present Restate-
ment. The draft does not mention ambiguity as a relevant factor, 
but that does not eliminate its occurrence-it merely means that 
there is no intelligent effort to deal with the occurrence. The rules 
formulated apply to instances of ambiguity whether or not the Re-
36. 229 N.Y. at 169-70, 128 N.E. at 123. 
37. Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N.Y. 187, 197, 105 N.E. 217, 221 (1914). 
38. § 71, comment a. 
39. The exception is a case in which one party knows the understanding of the 
other, whereas the latter does not know but only has "reason to know" the under-
standing of the first. Under the Tentative Draft, there is a contract in accordance 
with the understanding of the second party. In the present Restatement the situation 
seems to be uncovered, although possibly § 7l(c) would be read to mean that there 
is no contract. 
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staters recognize its existence or relevance. The present Restatement 
at least recognizes the relevance of ambiguity, but, as already pointed 
out, ignores the significance of differences in degree. The Tenta-
tive Draft produces the same lack of discrimination by ignoring 
ambiguity entirely. 
In the Silverstein case, nothing had occurred before the letter 
was sent to suggest to the father that the plaintiff was expecting a 
guaranty of the second son's obligations, from which one might well 
conclude that neither party had "reason to know the meaning 
attached by the other" to the father's promise. If this were the con-
clusion there would be no contract under the Tentative Draft, 
which contains the language just quoted.40 Very little room is left 
under this formula for finding that in the whole context the plain-
tiff's understanding was more reasonable than that of the defendant, 
and that this may be enough to justify holding the defendant to the 
plaintiff's understanding, especially when this is combined with the 
fact that the misleading words were used by the defendant.41 The 
court in Silverstein repeated the "reason to know" formula found 
in earlier New York opinions, but the basic approach of the court is 
revealed in Judge Cardozo's statement that the "jury were to fix the 
meaning in the light of all the circumstances."42 
The "reason to know" test, whether as formulated in the present 
Restatement or in the Tentative Draft, is inadequate even for cases 
of ambiguity. It becomes seriously deficient when, as in the Tenta-
tive Draft, it is extended to all cases of mis-qnderstanding, without 
regard to the clarity of the communications between the parties, 
and is made almost the sole test of contract liability. 
C. "Reason to Know"-Its Development in New York Cases 
It will be useful to consider some of the applications of the "rea-
son to know" formula in a single jurisdiction. In 1843, a New York 
court advanced "Dr. Paley's rule" for the interpretation of con-
tracts: "Where the terms of a promise admit of more senses than 
one, the promise is to be performed in that sense in which the 
40. TENTATIVE DRAFr § 2IA(l)(a). The statement in the text assumes that in 
Silverstein the issue went to the existence of the contract rather than its scope. 
41. If it were decided that the father did have reason to know the plaintiff's 
understanding, the Tentative Draft contains a significant change since the test it 
proposes is whether the plaintiff also had reason to know the meaning attached by the 
father to the words he used. TENTATIVE DRAFr § 21A(l)(b). If the plaintiff did have 
reason to know, there is again no contract, but at least there is some opportunity to 
find otherwise. The test of § 7l(b) of the present Restatement is whether each party 
had reason to know that the words were ambiguous, and, as suggested earlier, both 
parties seem to be in the same position on this question. 
42. 229 N.Y. at 171, 128 N.E. at 124. 
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promiser apprehended at the time the promisee received it."43 Some 
twenty years later the Court of Appeals restated Dr. Paley's rule in 
the form still found in the New York decisions: "It is a rule of law, 
as well as of ethics, that where the language of a promiser may be 
understood in more senses than one, it is to be interpreted in the 
sense in which he had reason to suppose it was understood by the 
promisee."44 In this formulation Dr. Paley's rule was extended be-
yond knowledge or apprehension to include "reason to suppose" 
and as so modified it is now offered in the Tentative Draft as a 
universal solution for cases of misunderstanding. In the process of 
adaptation, however, the Tentative Draft has omitted the qualifica-
tion that the language "may be understood in more senses than 
one." 
Although no exhaustive search has been made, nearly all of the 
New York cases found in which the "reason to know" formula is re-
peated have been viewed as raising only a question of interpretation 
of the contract rather than a question of initial validity or invalidity 
due to misunderstanding.46 In most situations involving interpreta-
tion no issue of contract formation is presented, simply because 
there is no evidence that there was misunderstanding when the 
contract was made. When controversy arose thereafter it was be-
cause the parties were then in disagreement as to the meaning 
of the contract, but if the disagreement goes no further than this 
it presents only a question of interpretation. In these circumstances 
the principal usefulness of a distinction between ambiguous and 
unambiguous language is that the "apparent" or "clear" or "un-
equivocal" or "plain" or "unambiguous" meaning will doubtless 
control unless in the whole context a different meaning is more rea-
sonable. A rule rejecting the use of extrinsic evidence in such a case 
is not to be countenanced, despite the frequency of its assertion. 
This, however, has nothing to do with the question of contract 
formation where there is misunderstanding. 
But Dr. Paley's rule seems to presuppose a situation in which 
43. Potter v. Ontario & Livingston l\fut. Ins. Co., 5 Hill 147, 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1843). Evidently the person referred to was William Paley, an eighteenth century 
English theologian. 
44. Hoffman &: Place v. Aetna Fire Ins. Co., 32 N.Y. 405, 413 (1865). In Silverstein, 
Judge Cardozo said: "The promise, if uncertain, was to be taken in the sense 'in 
which the promisor had reason to suppose it was understood by the promisee.' " 229 
N.Y. at 171, 128 N.E. at 124-. 
45. United States Rubber Co. v. Silverstein, 229 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E. 123 (1920); 
Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 2ll N.Y. 187, 105 N.E. 217 (1914-); Nellis v. Western Life 
Indcm. Co., 207 N.Y. 320, 100 N.E. lll9 (1913); White v. Hoyt, 73 N.Y. 505 (1878); 
Hoffman &: Place v. Aetna Fire Ins. Co., 32 N.Y. 405 (1865); Barlow v. Scott, 24 N.Y. 
40 (1861). 
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the promisee understood the promise in a certain way at the time 
it was made, and the promisor had reason to know of that under-
standing. 46 This gets closer to the question of contract formation, 
and the presence or absence of ambiguity becomes a factor of in-
escapable significance. If the meaning of the words is clear, judged 
by the appropriate standard, and the promisee followed this mean-
ing, the promisor will be held to it whether the issue is one of 
interpretation or of contract formation. Where meaning is uncertain 
Dr. Paley's rule may have some value, but the attempt to make it a 
universal test is not acceptable. A study of the New York cases in 
which the test is stated provides sufficient support for this conclu-
sion. In every case the court construed the contract against the 
party who used the words in question.47 This is a factor of known 
importance, yet it is wholly ignored in the blackletter rule of the 
Tentative Draft. In some cases the court construed the language 
in the light of the purposes of the contract,48 and in others its con-
struction was aided by a desire to avoid a one-sided contract.49 About 
all that can be said of the cases as a group is that relevant factors 
of this sort led the courts to give each contract the meaning that 
seemed most reasonable in the circumstances. 
In the case that first asserted Dr. Paley's rule,110 a fire insurance 
policy provided that, if the insured obtained other insurance on the 
same building, this additional insurance must be "acknowledged 
and approved" by the first insurer, otherwise the policy "shall cease 
and be of no further effect." The insured took out other insurance, 
46. Chancellor Kent used this qualification in formulating a rule similar to Dr. 
Paley's. He wrote: "The true principle of sound ethics is, to give the contract the 
sense in which the person making the promise believed the other party to have 
accepted it, if he in fact did so understand and accept it." 2 KENT, CoMMENTAIUES 
•557. In some of the cases purporting to apply the reason to know test, however, 
this fact is neither stated nor suggested by the evidence. In such cases the test has 
no significance. The decision rests instead on the court's conclusion that a meaning 
favoring the promisee is more reasonable in the circumstances than any other meaning 
claimed for the words. An example is Hoffman &: Place v. Aetna Fire Ins. Co., 32 
N.Y. 405 (1865). 
47. See the cases cited in notes 43-45 supra. In Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 211 
N.Y. 187, 105 N.E. 217 (1914), Judge Cardozo said: "Since the language is the de-
fendant's we must construe it, if its meaning is doubtful, most favorably to the 
plaintiff." Id. at 196, 105 N.E. at 220. 
48. Hoffman & Place v. Aetna Fire Ins. Co., 32 N.Y. 405 (1865); Potter v. Ontario 
&: Livingston Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Hill 147 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843). 
49. Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N.Y. 187, 105 N.E. 217 (1914). The written 
contract obligated the plaintiff to work for the defendant for five years, but the 
defendant, which had drawn the contract, took the position that it was not bound 
to employ the plaintiff for five years or any other period. In construing the contract 
favorably to the plaintiff, the opinion suggests an inclination to find that the "plain-
tiff's obligation to serve and the defendant's to employ were correlative and equal." 
Id. at 198, 105 N.E. at 221. 
50. Potter v. Ontario & Livingston Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Hill 147 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843). 
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sent the insurer written notice, and received in reply a letter stating: 
"I have received your notice of additional insurance." Nine days 
later the building was destroyed by fire. The court held the policy 
was in force. The insurer's letter constituted not only acknowledg-
ment but also acceptance within the meaning of the policy. The 
words of the letter were chosen by the insurance company, which 
could have made it clear that it was not accepting the insured's act 
if that was its intention; the objectives of the notice and acceptance 
requirement were sufficiently satisfied; and the consequence of in-
validating the policy after a loss had occurred was one that the court 
found unacceptable. Any attempt to sum all of this up in a "reason 
to know" requirement seriously overburdens that requirment. 
The "reason to know" test is doubtless sometimes useful in the 
process of deciding whether one party is bound to the understand-
ing of the other, but the position of Corbin and the Tentative Draft 
that he is so bound only if he has reason to know the other's un-
derstanding is not acceptable. 
II. THE NEED FOR LIMffiNG THE SCOPE OF CONTRACT 
Both the original Restatement and the Tentative Draft of the 
Restatement Second use the following illustration of a misunder-
standing:151 
A says to B, "I offer to sell you my horse for $100." B, knowing 
that A intends to offer to sell his cow for that price, not his horse, 
and that the word "horse" is a slip of the tongue, replies, "I accept." 
The two versions are agreed that there is no contract for the sale of 
the horse, even though that is what B intended to buy,52 and this 
conclusion is surely unassailable. The parties did not actually agree 
to such a contract. There was an apparent expression of agreement, 
but the reasons for holding A to the terms expressed are not present 
since B was not mis!ed. They would be present, however, if B were 
unaware of A's slip of the tongue and gave the words their normal 
meaning.153 
51. REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 71, Illustration 2 (1932); TENTATIVE DRAFr § 21A, 
Illustration 5. 
52. In the original Restatement, a literal reading of the illustration, including the 
statement that there "is no contract for the sale of either the horse or the cow," 
would mean that there was no contract for the cow even though B intended to buy 
the cow. The conclusion is surely unacceptable; there would be an actual agreement 
for sale of the cow in such a case, with no discernible reason for refusing to recog-
nize it. This conclusion would of course be changed under the Tentative Draft, 
since, as will be seen hereinafter, it proposes to hold B to a contract for the cow 
even though he intended to buy the horse. 
53. This of course is another example of the problem discussed in Part I, and 
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The original Restatement took the position that there is no 
contract for sale of the cow but this is changed in the Tentative 
Draft, which asserts that there is such a contract. This is an applica-
tion of the rule stated in the second subsection of section 2 lA, read-
ing in part as follows: "The manifestations of the parties are opera-
tive in accordance with the meaning attached to them by one of 
the parties if ... that party does not know of any different meaning 
attached by the other, and the other knows the meaning attached 
by the first party." Like the first subsection the generalization ig-
nores all distinction between ambiguity and lack of ambiguity in 
the words and other acts constituting the means of communica-
tion. 
Although the matter is by no means free of doubt, it is believed 
that this new position exemplified in the horse-cow case is both 
unwise and largely unsupported in the decisions. If it be assumed 
that B preferred the horse to the cow, possibly because it was worth 
more than $100 whereas the cow was not, his acceptance was an 
attempt to take unfair advantage of A and it is clear that he will not 
be allowed that advantage. But the question is whether his inequi-
table conduct will result in his disadvantage by holding him to a 
contract he never intended to make. If the words were ambiguous 
B would be held to A's meaning,54 and it is not immediately evident 
why the result should be different because the words used are 
regarded as unambiguous. 55 Nonetheless, the distinction should be 
drawn. When the words are unambiguous neither of the generally 
accepted bases of contract formation is present. There has been 
neither actual agreement nor expression of agreement for the sale 
of the cow. 
To say that the language used expresses such an agreement be-
cause A intended to offer to sell his cow would tend to obliterate 
the distinction between what a person says and what he intends to 
say. The distinction is sometimes difficult to apply, yet it is funda-
mental both in common experience and in our legal system. Where 
there is mistake in integration, it produces the difference betvveen 
under the Tentative Draft a valid contract would depend on a finding that A had 
"reason to know" the meaning attached by B. There is no basis for such a finding, 
but there is a contract nonetheless. 
54. E.g., Barlow v. Scott, 24 N.Y. 40 (1861). 
55. In some circumstances the situation should be judged not only by the words 
used but also by other conduct expressive of A's intent. Thus, if the communication 
took place while the parties were examining the cow, the context in which the 
words were used and the other acts of the parties would justify a decision that there 
was a contract to sell the cow regardless of B's undisclosed intent to purchase the 
horse. 
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matters that can be dealt with through interpretation and those 
that must be left for reformation, a difference that becomes of vital 
importance in connection with wills, since courts do not assert the 
power to reform a will.trn The distinction is of vital importance also 
in connection with inter vivos transactions. Thus, if a donor intends 
to convey Blackacre as a gift but the words of the deed mistakenly 
describe Whiteacre, he is entitled to rescind the conveyance of 
Whiteacre because of mistake, nor does the intended donee have 
any enforceable claim against him to compel completion of the in-
tended gift of Blackacre.57 A court would reject out of hand a claim 
by the donee that the deed should be construed to cover Blackacre 
because this was what the donor intended. In short, a distinction 
would be recognized between what the grantor intended to express 
and what in fact he did express by the language of the deed. 
The consequences of the rule proposed in the Tentative Draft 
are also undesirable. The rule is formulated at a high level of 
abstraction. Horse and cow are used merely as symbols, so that the 
rule really comes to this: If A offers X when he means Y and B ac-
cepts knowing that A means Y, B is held to a contract for Y even 
though he intended X. This is not an intelligent way to formulate 
contract doctrine because it ignores a critical element-the possible 
differences benveen X and Y. The consequence may be a consider-
able hardship on B and an equally large enrichment of A, but seem-
ingly nothing would be done about this if the position of the 
Tentative Draft were accepted. Some examples may help to demon-
strate the shortcomings of the proposed rule. 
If the horse in the Restatement's illustration was worth $1,000, 
the cow was worth $300, and A's offer was to sell the horse (meaning 
cow) for $600, a decision that B is contractually liable to pay $600 
for the cow inflicts on him a punishment that does not fit the wrong. 
For a second example, assume that A owns nvo adjoining tracts of 
land: Blackacre, which is worth about $100,000 largely because of 
standing timber, and Whiteacre, which has been logged and is 
worth about $25,000. B wishes to buy both tracts, A is willing to 
sell Blackacre for $110,000 and Whiteacre for $50,000, but B has 
told A that he is not interested at these prices. A few days later A 
sends B a letter in which he intends to offer Whiteacre at $40,000, 
but by mistake the letter describes Blackacre. B accepts by return 
mail. It is evident that B knew A did not intend to offer Black-
56. Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210 (1886). 
57. Marvin v. Kelsey, 373 Ill. 589, 27 N.E.2d 469, 128 A.L.R. 1299 (1940); DAWSON 
&: PALMER, CASF.S ON 'RESnTUTION 865-69 (1958). 
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acre for $40,000 and almost equally evident that he knew A meant 
Whiteacre. Under the Tentative Draft there is a contract for the 
sale of Whiteacre for $40,000, which is $15,000 more than it is 
worth. This is not an acceptable result. It neither corresponds to 
the general theories that have guided judicial decision in this area, 
nor is it a just solution of the problem. Yet once a contract is 
found there is little possibility of relief to B through avoidance as 
a means of preventing unjust enrichment. In order to avoid unjust 
enrichment, courts sometimes grant restitution to a party who 
has breached his contract, but there seems to be no authority for 
allowing a party guilty of inequitable conduct to rescind a con-
tract imposed on him because of that conduct. 58 
If there are circumstances in which it seems preferable to hold 
B to the terms intended by A, this can be done through estoppel. 
Thus, if A intends to offer his cow for sale for $300, a fair price, 
but by a slip of the tongue he says $200, and B accepts knowing 
that A meant $300, it is fair to hold B to a contract at that price. 
Where B has received the goods with knowledge of the price A is 
demanding, courts have held him liable at that price;59 but even 
though the transaction is wholly executory this seems a proper case 
for holding that B is estopped to assert that he did not agree to pay 
the price he knew A intended. Since it is a fair exchange this will 
not unjustly enrich A. 
The use of estoppel provides a needed flexibility that is lacking 
once we accept the mathematical formula proposed in the Tenta-
tive Draft. There is an openness in the concept of estoppel that 
has served courts well for many centuries in working out equitable 
solutions to situations that do not fit neatly into an established 
mold. 00 There is no comparable opportunity through use of the 
58. In comment d to § 21A of the Tentative Draft, the offeree (B) is described 
as the party at fault with the suggestion that "he may be guilty of fraud." The pos-
sibility of rescission at the instance of the innocent party is mentioned, but it is 
evident that no one supposes the guilty party might be entitled to rescission. 
59. Germain Fruit Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 137 Cal. 598, 70 Pac. 658 (1902); 
Mummenhoff v. Randall, 19 Ind. App. 44, 49 N.E. 40 (1898); Estey Organ Co. v. 
Lehman, 132 Wis. 144, 111 N.W. 1097 (1907). Liability could also be based on unjust 
enrichment and in some of the cases it is not altogether clear whether the theory 
was contract or quasi contract. In Mutual Sales Agency, Inc. v. Hori, 145 ,vash. 236, 
259 Pac. 712 (1927), restitution was denied the buyer after he had paid the price 
demanded by the seller. 
60. This is not the same as the suggestion sometimes made that contract requires 
actual agreement, and that all other situations normally covered by the objective 
theory are to be worked out in terms of estoppel. Williston considered and rejected 
this approach in an important article. Williston, Mutual Assent in the Formation 
of Contracts, 14 ILL. L. REv. 85 (1919). 
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principles of unjust enrichment if the point of departure is a con-
tract found by application of the proposed formula. 
Ill. REFORMATION WHERE THERE Is MISUNDERSTANDING 
It may be that one reason for the proposed extension of contract 
doctrine as just discussed is to eliminate an existing discrepancy in 
the Restatement between the principles governing contract forma-
tion and those governing reformation. This cannot be said with 
certainty by one not involved in the preparation of the Restatement 
Second, since, as yet, there has been no public submission of any 
new rules governing reformation. Under the present Restatement 
reformation is sometimes called for so as to put into effect a contract 
the parties never made, as tested by its rules for contract formation. 
This departs from the generally accepted role of reformation. If the 
presently stated rules for reformation are to be continued in the 
Restatement Second, the proposed changes discussed in Part II will 
eliminate the discrepancy, but will do so by an unwarranted ex-
pansion of the scope of contract. The proper corrective is to limit 
the scope of reformation more narrowly than it is now in section 505 
of the Restatement, which reads: 
If one party at the time of the execution of a written instrument 
knows not only that the writing does not accurately express the 
intention of the other party as to the terms to be embodied therein, 
but knows what that intention is, the latter can have the writing 
reformed so that. it will express that intention. 
The statement is too broad. It is one of those generalizations 
that seems to be supported by many decisions when in fact it does 
not contain the limitations implicit in those decisions. There are 
many cases involving mistake of one party known to the other in 
which reformation was granted, but only after finding an agreement 
to reform to, a limitation not contained in section 505. One group 
consists of cases in which actual agreement was reached but the 
writing failed to express the agreement correctly and this was known 
to the defendant. 61 He knew the writing did not "accurately express 
the intention" of the plaintiff, and he knew what that intention 
was, all as provided in section 505, but reformation went on the 
narrower ground that he knew the writing did not express the 
agreement they had reached and meant to embody in the writing.62 
61. E.g., Chelsea Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 74 N.J. Eq. 275, 69 Atl. 533 (Ch. 1908). 
62, An unusually clear analysis to this effect appears in Welles v. Yates, 44 N.Y. 
525 (1871). 
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In a second group are cases in which there was no actual agreement 
to provide a standard for reformation, but the application of the 
objective theory of contract formation provided the agreement to 
serve as the standard. An example is the case in which an insurer 
in issuing a policy intentionally departed from the terms of the 
insured's application for insurance.63 
All of these cases are within the generally accepted objective of 
reformation: to put into effect an agreement found in accordance 
with the rules of law pertaining to the formation of contracts. But 
section 505 requires no search for an agreement to provide the basis 
for reformation. Although there are instances of reformation not 
so limited, 64 the section does not state an acceptable principle 
operating independently of the law of contract. 
If A intends to offer goods for sale for $2,000 but through error 
writes $1,000, and B accepts the offer knowing A has made an error 
in the price, there is no contract at the price of $1,000. If B also 
knows that A intended the offering price to be $2,000 there is 
still no contract under the present Restatement; on these bare facts 
A cannot on contract principles hold B to an agreement to buy 
for $2,000. As suggested earlier, in proper circumstances a court 
might hold that B was estopped to deny that he had contracted at 
the higher price, but if the market value of the goods were $1,200 
this would not be a proper case to invoke estoppel. To hold B to 
an obligation to pay A $2,000 would result in an undesirable enrich-
ment of A.65 Yet under section 505, if the same transaction were 
integrated in a ·writing, A would be entitled to reformation so as 
to hold B to a price of $2,000. There is no rational basis for such a 
difference in results, dependent on whether the agreement was 
or was not integrated in a writing, nor do the decisions support 
such a distinction. If there are circumstances that would cause a 
court to hold that B is estopped to deny that there was a contract 
on the terms intended, when the issue is one of contract formation, 
the same circumstances would support reformation when the issue 
arises that way. But B's knowledge of A's intention, standing alone, 
is not sufficient reason for an estoppel. 
If it may be assumed that the rule now stated in section 505 
is to be continued in the Restatement Second, the changes proposed 
63. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Oakley Improved Bldg. &: Loan Co., 80 F.2d 717 
(6th Cir. 1936). 
64. See the text accompanying notes 72 & 73 infra. 
65. The problem is different if the parties reached agreement on a price of $2,000, 
but the writing erroneously read $1,000, and B was aware of the error whereas A 
was not. It is just in these circumstances to reform so as to hold B to a price of 
$2,000 since he had agreed to that price, even though the agreement was not to 
become effective until execution of the writing. 
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in the rules relative to contract formation will eliminate the present 
inconsistency in the Restatement, but in the wrong manner. In 
the case just described B would be held to a contract at $2,000, 
although the goods were worth only $1,200, whether the issue was 
one of contract formation or reformation. 
Cases presenting this general problem in connection with ref-
ormation are not usually as clear-cut as the situation just dis-
cussed. In some, the search for an agreement to provide the standard 
for reformation carries the court into dealings between the parties 
that preceded the ·writings, and the stuff out of which an agreement 
may be constructed will often be acts as well as words. This is true 
of Hugo v. Erickson,66 where the court reformed a contract to sell 
land so as to include an entire lot having a depth of 130 feet, instead 
of merely the front eighty-five feet described in the writing. It was 
clear to the vendor, who was present when the purchaser examined 
the lot, that the purchaser thought the entire lot was being offered 
for sale and the vendor's conduct was a cause of this belief. The 
words used at this stage to describe the subject matter were of less 
importance than other acts. Contract rules formulated primarily 
with respect to writings, stressing the ambiguity or lack of ambiguity 
of the language used, have little to do with such a case. I£ the facts 
in Hugo v. Erickson were viewed through the eyes of a disinterested 
observer, virtually everything that occurred during the period when 
an apparent understanding was shaped pointed in the direction of 
a sale of the entire lot. When this was combined with the fact that 
the vendor was aware of the purchaser's understanding, contract 
ideas fully warranted holding the vendor to that understanding. 
In other situations, the words used during the period when 
agreement was shaped play a larger role. In Russell v. Shell Petro-
leum Corp.,61 N and B owned jointly a tract of 150 acres, and 
pursuant to a partition agreement N delivered to B a deed of the 
south part which accurately defined by metes and bounds and effec-
tively conveyed 75 acres. The deed included, however, the descrip-
tive words, "the south one-half of the northeast quarter." This in-
cluded only 70 acres; the northerly five acres were in fact in the 
north one-half of the quarter-section. The plaintiff obtained a 
lease from B of the "south one-half," believing that this comprised 
all the land owned by B in the quarter-section, and B knew of the 
plaintiff's mistaken belief. In refusing reformation of the lease, the 
court stayed within traditional limits. The only agreement reached 
was the one expressed in the ·writing, and the lessor's inequitable 
66. 110 Neb. 602, 194 N.W. 723 (1923). 
67. 66 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1933). 
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conduct was at most a ground for rescission. Mistake of one party 
coupled with fraud or inequitable conduct of the other provides 
a ground for reformation, the court said, only where "the written 
instrument fails to express the real agreement or transaction."68 
Throughout the negotiations the land had been referred to as the 
"south half," but the sense in which the plaintiff used the words 
could vary with the circumstances. The words have a conventional 
meaning, as descriptive of an area identified through a survey, and 
the plaintiff apparently was dealing by reference to the tract descrip-
tion. I£ so, the agreement made was the one the plaintiff intended 
to make, although not the one it would have made had it been 
better informed. There was no mistake in expression, only in under-
lying assumptions. If, however, the plaintiff had inspected the land, 
and had in mind a tract with geographical boundaries that corre-
sponded to the land owned by the lessor, the same words for it 
would have referred to that land and reformation would be called 
for. This would not rest on the broad principle that the other party 
knew the terms the plaintiff intended should be embodied in the 
writing (the test of the Restatement),69 but rather on the ground 
that, under accepted contract rules, the other party's knowledge 
would operate to bind him to the plaintiff's understanding. This is 
the aspect in which the case would differ from the one previously 
discussed, where the offeree was aware of the mistake in an offer to 
sell property for $1,000. The words or other symbols used there 
did not carry any meaning other than the one normally given them. 
Even in the case just mentioned, reformation to the intended 
price of $2,000 would be appropriate if the offeree's conduct was 
such that the other was reasonably entitled to believe he was con-
senting to a price of $2,000. This would be likely to occur only 
where there were prior negotiations looking to that price. The 
possibilities are illustrated by Trenton Terra Cotta Co. v. Clay 
Shingle Co.,70 where the defendant, owner of a patent for the manu-
facture of clay shingles, negotiated with the plaintiff for manufac-
turing under a license. The defendant submitted a form of proposed 
contract providing for a royalty of fifty cents for each "square" 
manufactured, an advance royalty payment of $2,000, and a promise 
by the plaintiff to manufacture at least 3,000 squares a year begin-
68. Id. at 866; accord, McConnell v. Pickering Lumber Corp., 217 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 
1954). 
69. It is assumed that § 505 of the Restatement, in speaking of a mistake as to 
"terms," is not meant to limit reformation to cases in which the mistake was as to 
the words used in the writing. It is settled generally that reformation is available 
where the mistake is as to the meaning or significance or legal effect of known words. 
70. 80 Fed. 46 (C.C.D.N.J. 1897). 
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ning in 1893 or to pay a royalty on that amount. The plaintiff by 
letter objected to the $2,000 advance royalty and to the time when 
the guaranteed minimum royalty was to start. The defendant re-
plied by letter, withdrawing its demand for an advance payment 
and stating that it would agree to commencing the minimum 
royalty in 1894. The plaintiff then sent a letter containing the fol-
lowing critical passage: "Draw up your lease, leaving out tlie ad-
vance royalty, and make no restrictions as to amount of shingles we 
must make during '92 and '93. After '93 can make it 30,000 
squares .... " The figure "30,000" was an error; plaintiff intended 
to write "3,000." But the error was repeated in the written contract, 
and after its discovery the plaintiff sued for and obtained reforma-
tion to conform to his intention. The court did not inquire into 
the defendant's state of mind. The result would be the same, it 
said, whether or not the plaintiff's mistake was shared by or known 
to the defendant. It is a wise decision, not based however on any 
principle peculiar to reformation; in the circumstances the de-
fendant should be held to the plaintiff's understanding of the term 
in question whether the issue arises as one of reformation or of con-
tract formation. 
When the defendant accepted the plaintiff's offer the latter was 
reasonably entitled to believe from this act that the defendant was 
consenting to a minimum royalty based on 3,000 squares. No other 
figure had been mentioned during the course of their negotiations. 
Conceivably the defendant did not read beyond the first sentence of 
the letter containing plaintiff's offer, since that dealt with the only 
matters in dispute, or he may have read the second sentence to say 
3,000, since that was what he was expecting to read. In either case 
the conclusion would be virtually inescapable that he intended the 
amount to be 3,000 and there would be a contract at that figure 
based on actual assent. Conceivably he noticed the error but did not 
intend to take advantage of it: the analysis would be the same. 
Conceivably he read the amount correctly and thought the plaintiff 
was proposing a new term, but in the circumstances there was no 
reasonable basis for such belief,71 whereas there was reasonable 
basis for the plaintiff's belief that the defendant was consenting to 
the 3,000 figure. Again, the defendant should be bound to that 
amount. Conceivably he read the figure correctly, knew that the 
plaintiff intended 3,000, and meant to take advantage of the error. 
This would bring the facts within the language of section 505, but 
the important point is that reformation does not depend on this. 
71. The court considered this possibility and rejected it. Id. at 48. 
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It would be granted in any event, because the plaintiff intended 
3,000 squares as the measure of the minimum royalty, he believed 
that the defendant had the same intention, this belief was fully 
justified by the defendant's conduct, and the circumstances did not 
reasonably support a belief by the defendant that the plaintiff was 
consenting to 30,000 squares, even if the defendant held that un-
likely belief. 
Although the general objective of reformation is that heretofore 
suggested, that is, to put into effect the contract the parties intended 
to put into effect, measured by accepted contract principles, there 
is a heterogeneous collection of cases in which reformation is given 
with little or no attempt to bring the situation within these tradi-
tional boundaries. The common link among the cases seems to be 
that the facts call for some relief and the only satisfactory relief 
available is a decree in the nature of reformation, even though 
this binds the defendant to a contract to which he would not be 
bound under accepted contract doctrine. Many examples involve 
insurance policies where the issue arises after loss has occurred,72 
but the solution appears in other situations as well.73 This is not the 
occasion for a full discussion of such decisions. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Two distinct types of cases have been discussed: first, those in-
volving true misunderstanding, in the sense that the parties were in 
_disagreement without being aware of it; and, second, those in which 
the parties intended to contract on different terms but one of 
them knew this to be the case whereas the other did not. 
In the first situation, contract rules should be formulated by 
reference to the need for stability and finality of business arrange-
ments. Usually, each party believes a contract has been made but 
they have different conceptions of its terms. Occasionally, one 
party believes there is a contract whereas the other does not. 
In either case a finding of contract involves a choice whereby the 
expectations of one party will be realized, at least potentially, while 
the expectations of the other will be defeated or impaired. There 
should be persuasive reasons for favoring the expectations of one 
party and these reasons must be found largely in the fact, where it 
is a fact, that his expectations are clearly more reasonable than 
those of the other party. Such a determination requires the applica-
72. Heake v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 15 N.J. 475, 105 A.2d 526 (1954). 
73. E.g., Town of Essex v. Day, 52 Conn. 483, I Atl. 620 (1885); Thomas v. Satfield 
Co., 363 Mich. Ill, 108 N.W.2d 907 (1961); Brandwein v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
3 N.Y.2d 491, 146 N.E.2d 693, 168 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1957). 
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tion of some standard of meaning or usage, and sometimes a choice 
benv-een two standards where the misunderstanding arose from the 
fact that the parties were following different standards. 
When the question of meaning turns largely on the language 
used in expressing agreement, there are polar differences on the 
scale from ambiguity to clarity. At one end, words sometimes bear 
a single reasonable meaning in the particular context, and when 
this is true there is normally a contract in accordance with that 
meaning. At the other end, words sometimes carry a double mean-
ing, with each meaning having a fairly equal claim to recognition-
the "equivocation" as it is knmm in the law of wills.74 In this situa-
tion there will be no contract unless there is some compelling rea-
son for favoring one meaning over the other. If there is such a 
reason it must be provided by factors outside the language, such as 
which party chose the language and the extent to which he was 
in a position to dictate the choice. 
When the case is not at either extreme, solution may tum on 
whether one meaning is clearly more reasonable than the other, but 
extrinsic factors become even more important in deciding whether 
one party should fairly be held to the understanding of the other. 
Recently it has been suggested that a finding of no contract because 
of misunderstanding should be limited to cases of equivocation or 
double meaning,75 but the suggestion has little to commend it. It 
rests on an exaggerated estimate of the destructive effects of a 
wider rule, as is indicated in the statement that the limitation is 
necessary "so that countless agreements to which the courts routinely 
give effect will not be rendered unenforceable."76 This fails to take 
sufficient account of the fact that in most of these "countless cases" 
there probably was no evidence of a clear misunderstanding when 
the contract was made-they are typical cases in which disagree-
ment arose later and the issue is one of interpretation, nothing 
more.77 
There is value, however, in the same writer's suggestion that 
account be taken of the factor of vagueness, although it is believed 
74. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDJ:NCE § 2472 (3d ed. 1940). 
75. Young, Equivocation in the Making of Agreements, 64 CoLuM. L. REv. 619, 
646 (1964). 
76. Ibid. 
77. In other cases the term will not be vital enough to justify upsetting the en-
tire arrangement, or will be so related to the rest of the arrangement that its 
excision will not prevent giving effect to what remains. This aspect of the problem 
is wholly ignored in the present Restatement, § 71, and largely so in the Tentative 
Draft, § 21A. In the latter the blackletter rule provides generally that there is no 
contract if the parties "attach materially different meanings to their manifesta-
tions." Presumably there could be materi:illy different meanings on an unimportant 
point. 
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that he separates vagueness much too sharply from other kinds of 
ambiguity or uncertainty. There are times when, because of the 
generality or vagueness of the language chosen, misunderstanding 
will not prevent the formation of a contract despite the fact that the 
different understandings of the parties are equally reasonable. For 
example, if parties should agree on the construction of a dam, "to 
be completed within a reasonable time from the date of this con-
tract," the court might find the contract invalid for indefiniteness as 
to an essential term. It is much more likely, however, to uphold the 
contract and determine what is a reasonable time if that becomes 
necessary.78 This would be true even though, when the contract was 
signed, one party thought a reasonable time was not more than 
twelve months, whereas the other thought it was at least eighteen 
months. Such a case involves two levels of understanding. On one 
level the parties had different intentions but on another level they 
expressed their agreement by using words of indeterminate mean-
ing. Interpretation of those words and enforcement of the contract 
as so interpreted gives effect to a term to which they assented and 
meant to put into effect. In agreeing to an indefinite term it is as 
though they had agreed to leave the matter open for judicial deter-
mination should that become necessary.79 
In the second situation, where the parties intended to contract 
on different terms but one of them was aware of their variant in-
tentions, the inequitable conduct of one party will of course be 
taken into account, whether the issue arises in connection with con-
tract formation or reformation. Reasonable differences of meaning 
that would lead to a finding of no contract in the first situation will 
here be resolved in favor of the innocent party. But it is unwise to 
adopt an inflexible rule that, regardless of the circumstances, one 
party will be held to the understanding of the other merely because 
he knows of it. There needs to be enough play in contract doctrine 
that the factor of enrichment of the innocent party can be taken 
into account, especially where, because of mistake, he uses or assents 
to words that do not have the meaning he intended in any realm 
of discourse relevant to the case. 
78. Neenan v. Otis Elevator Co., 180 Fed. 997 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), aff'd, 194 Fed. 
414 (2d Cir. 1912). 
79. :Because of the exigencies of the particular situation, the parties were 
deliberately silent as to price; and thus they imported into their contract the 
standard of reasonableness which the law implies in a contract mute as to price 
and providing no mode or standard for the fixation of the price. • • • fE]quity 
will by some appropriate method determine what is a fair and reasonable price 
under all the circumstances. 
Mantell v. International Plastic Harmonica Corp., 141 N.J. Eq. 379, 387-88, 55 A.2d 
250, 255-56 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1947). 
